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Next Steps for abuse-c

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Address validation



- ripe-563 mandates any resource be covered by a dedicated contact for reporting abuse
 - Full coverage is nearly completed
 - Data quality can be improved
- Contact addresses are only syntactically checked, but they could be non-existent
- Validation of the contact can help increase data quality and lower frustration on the user side

- Possible forms of validation (to be discussed)
 - Callback verification (no email is sent)
 - Send an email and check the reply
- Results of the validation can be used to:
 - Notify the resource holders privately and ask them to correct the contact in case validation fails
 - Display the validation result with the contact (e.g. in the RIPE Database, Abuse Contact Finder, etc.)



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Collaboration with national CSIRTs



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- By design, ripe-563 does not mention what can be expected if an incident is reported
- From user feedback, we see that failed attempts to report abuse are increasing
- Multiple reasons:
 - Email bounces
 - Incorrect email address
 - Technical issues (MX record, mail server, etc.)
 - Emails simply get ignored

- Proposed solution: provide the user with an alternative contact to the one given in abuse-c
- CSIRT = Computer Security Incidence Response Team
- “National CSIRT” = CSIRT with national responsibility
 - Network monitoring and analysis
 - Vulnerability analysis
 - Research on trends, threats, risk assessment

- How are we going to do that?
 - Add support to the Abuse Contact Finder tool
 - abuse-c contact will still be provided
 - Contact details to the national CSIRT responsible for the resource (RIR-Stat based)
- What can we expect them to do?
 - Analysis and assessment of the reported incident
 - CSIRT can contact team responsible for abusing network
 - CSIRT can advise and share technical expertise with affected parties (end users or network operators)

- Benefits

- CSIRT can act as a pre-filter, only passing genuine cases to network operators
- CSIRTs maintain a network to share information
 - Quick and efficient action on an incident
 - Reports can indicate trends at an early stage so prevention mechanisms can be set



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Extend role Object



- Abuse can have multiple forms:
 - Spam
 - Hacking
 - Copyright infringement
 - Other types
- The single “abuse-mailbox:” attribute in the abuse **role** object does not allow different contact addresses for various forms of abuse
- CSIRT community ask for coverage of additional abuse cases

- Proposed solution
 - Abuse **role** object can be extended with new attributes:
 - Example: “copyright-abuse-mailbox:”



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Handling More Specifics



- Currently in progress – contacting resource holders and sponsoring LIRs
- Currently 33% of IPv4 and 44% of IPv6 PI objects covered by “abuse-c:”
- Deadline is end of September 2014
- After deadline, LIRs abuse contact added to remaining PI assignments who don't have one

- After PI deadline (September) clean-up starts
- Remove old “abuse-mailbox:” attributes from:
 - person, organisation, mntner, irt objects
- Remove “abuse-mailbox:” attributes from **role** objects not referenced by “abuse-c:” attribute

- Two issues raised
 - Same organisation with different subnet abuse-c needs
 - End User organisations handling own abuse
- For subnets, propose additional “abuse-c:” in LIRs
organisation object:
- organisation: ORG-LIRA-RIPE
org-type: LIR
abuse-c: AH9936-RIPE <--- default
abuse-c: AH9955-RIPE {10.0.0.0/16} <--- an LIR subnet
abuse-c: AH8888-RIPE {fd30::1/64} <--- another subnet

- For End Users, we propose a wizard to set up the necessary additional objects from basic info
- Wizard will also delete unnecessary objects if End User no longer handles abuse
- See RIPE Labs article for more details on both issues:
 - <https://labs.ripe.net/Members/denis/suggestions-for-improving-abuse-handling>

